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How many lightbulbs does it 
take to change the financial 




Ideas may impact economic policy change, but their specific effects are difficult to untangle. 
Material factors may influence both ideational change and policy change. In order to study these 
complex interrelationships, this article looks at the impact of both ideational change (the rise and 
fall and rise of free-market economics) and material factors (competitive pressure, crises, and 
domestic politics) on financial regulatory change and on one another in the United Kingdom and 
United States since 1846. Using a vector error correction model, I find that elite ideas influenced 
regulation in Britain, but not the United States. Material factors exhibited more explanatory power 
in both cases, although institutional differences between Britain and the United States made some 
shocks more or less important in either country. Material factors also influenced ideational change 
in both cases.
Keywords
financial regulation, history of economic thought, international political economy, international 
relations, macrohistory, time series
Lately, scholars of financial regulation have been ‘cursed’ with interesting times. In the 
1980s and 1990s, a wave of deregulation produced many financial innovations, while 
subsequent crises prompted stricter rules. Recent episodes of reform are but the latest 
examples of a longstanding historical process. Typically, banking and securities regula-
tion experiences bouts of epochal change followed by long periods of regulatory stasis.1 
However, it has proven difficult to reach conclusions about why the regulatory pendulum 
swings from stringency to laxity and back again, because many plausible explanations 
coincide temporally.
Extant works present a range of plausible drivers of financial reform including eco-
nomic ideas, the impact of crises, global competitive pressures, and domestic politics. 
Some scholars emphasize purely ideational discussions of policy change (Skidelsky, 
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2010), while others prefer more nuanced arguments. Explorations of ideational evolution 
during crises (Blyth, 2002; Widmaier et al., 2007) tell us much about the causal mecha-
nisms behind policy change. The impact of ideational change can be mediated by national 
institutions (Hall, 1989). Works operating from the epistemic community framework pro-
vide evidence that ideas influence policy by infiltrating the corridors of power (Adler and 
Haas, 1992; Chwieroth, 2007, 2010). Other works offer materialist explanations of regu-
latory change, emphasizing interest group politics (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Suarez 
and Kolodny, 2011), the material impact of crises (Grossman, 2010; Higgs, 1987), inter-
state competition (Costigliola, 1977), or a mix of factors (Helleiner, 1996; Helleiner and 
Pagliari, 2010).
Although existing works greatly advance our understanding of the drivers of regula-
tory change, the tendency for scholars to fall in ideational or materialist camps is limiting. 
Many materialist scholars ignore plausible ideational explanations of reform outright. 
Many ideational accounts explain how material factors facilitate the spread of ideas, but 
say less about material influences on the process of idea generation. We should develop 
eclectic theories of regulatory change that address the potential for multiple directions of 
causation, and stronger tests of two-way causation.
Additionally, most empirical tests of regulation examine short time periods or sin-
gle reform episodes. Quantitative studies typically emphasize the recent past (Kroszner 
and Strahan, 1999; Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Yet shifts in both economic ideas and 
financial regulatory change often follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern, ill-suited to 
short-term analysis.2 Qualitative works tend toward case studies of major events (par-
ticularly financial crises). Although useful, the conclusions of case studies may be 
over-determined. Many aspects of, say, the Great Depression contributed to increased 
financial regulation. Testing theories against the variation offered by long periods of 
history is useful for generating robust theories.
In this article, I seek to understand complex ideational–material linkages in economic 
policymaking, and to examine which factors best explain historical patterns of regula-
tion. I develop an eclectic framework for assessing the ideational and material causes of 
financial reform, as well as their complex interactions. I argue that financial crises, com-
petitive pressures, and the relative influence of the financial sector are all plausible driv-
ers of regulatory policy. I am more skeptical about the ability of broad ideational 
shifts—particularly shifts toward and against free markets3—to explain policy reform 
(for instance, ‘neoliberalism caused deregulation’). Ideational shifts often occur along-
side material shifts that could influence reform and the processes by which ideas are 
generated.4 I do not mean that ideas are irrelevant. Ideas prominent among elites may 
exhibit influence on policy, and may vary from those in public discussion.
Empirically, I develop a long-term vector error correction (VEC) model of financial 
regulation in the United Kingdom (1846–2005) and the United States (1870–2007) to 
examine what drives change. A VEC model is useful in addressing a number of the stick-
ing points facing the literature. VEC models are robust to multidirectional causation, and 
thus can provide information not only on what drives regulatory change, but also on the 
factors that influence ideational change itself. Additionally, a long-term quantitative 
approach can overcome the problems of over-determination plaguing case study 
approaches, while modeling the punctuated equilibrium pattern typifying financial reform.
I seek to understand why countries sometimes adopt endorse lax regulation of finan-
cial intermediaries, while at other times they prefer stringent rules.5 Specifically, I am 
interested in whether states favor capital requirements, unit banking regulations, rules 
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against margin trading, and comprehensive reporting requirements for intermediaries. 
Deregulation allows capital to flow towards innovative and profitable opportunities, but 
raises the risk of financial crises, while the latter implies the opposite (Loayza and 
Ranciere, 2006; Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Growth and risk are not the only tradeoffs in 
financial regulation—Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) emphasize the distinction between 
pro-competitive and anti-competitive reforms, while some rules (for instance usury laws) 
pose distributional consequences. However, the innovation–risk tradeoff is useful to 
investigate because it informs both current and historical debates about post-crisis reform.
Theory-building
In this section, I present an eclectic framework for predicting financial regulatory change. 
In particular, I develop theoretical rationales for four factors driving financial regulation: 
financial crises, the sectoral impact of financial crises, the relative power of the financial 
sector domestically, and competitive pressures globally. Next I explore how each factor 
might interact with the battle of economic ideas.
Ideational change is not an exogenous process—theories do not rise to prominence in 
a vacuum. As academics, we often acknowledge motivations beyond the pure quest for 
truth: ‘how does this hypothesis fit with the literature?’ ‘Will the (US) National Science 
Foundation approve this request for funding?’ or ‘will this line of research lead to a job?’ 
Many factors linking ideas to policy also impact the generation of ideas. Accounting for 
feedback effects, I am skeptical of the explanatory power of broad ideational shifts like 
‘great man’ versions of economic history, or explanations of policy emphasizing eras of 
‘Keynesianism’ or ‘neoliberalism’. Although economic theory matters, public and aca-
demic debates furnish policymakers with an abundance of options. How politicians 
choose from an expansive menu may be more important than the composition of that 
menu. The impact of ideas is thus best understood by examining more specific sets of 
ideas, their links with the corridors of power, and accounting for feedback loops from 
material factors.
Crises
Some explanations of policy change explore how crises—including wars and financial 
crises—alter policy (Blyth, 2002; Widmaier et al., 2007). Crises create an uncertain envi-
ronment, from which policy entrepreneurs can emerge, prescribing solutions, and reshaping 
the identities underlying political contention. Indeed, the crisis label itself may be an act of 
construction (Baker and Underhill, 2015). For instance, in the United States, the unemploy-
ment rate was higher in the early 1980s recession than after the 2008 financial crisis, but the 
Reagan years are remembered as ‘morning in America, again’, while 2008 is ‘the worst 
economic calamity since the Great Depression’ (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2016).
Crises encourage a search for ‘what went wrong’. While some works argue that crises 
tend to promote increased regulation and intervention (Grossman, 2010; Higgs, 1987) for 
prudential and political reasons, others disagree (Crouch, 2011). Opponents of regulation 
may be able to construct alternate narratives of why crises occurred (for example, con-
servative explanations of the US Subprime crisis blamed the crisis on the Community 
Reinvestment Act). Similarly, Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2015) discusses how the idea of 
‘expansionary’ fiscal contractions diffused in the 1990s and 2000s. Understanding why 
some crises lead to increased regulation, while others do not is useful.
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Financial crises are not merely national events—they are also distributive events that 
alter the balance of power between domestic interests. It can be useful to think of different 
financial crises along a spectrum of distributional outcomes. At one extreme, a ‘finance-
heavy’ crisis, the brunt of the crisis falls on the financial sector in the form of bank fail-
ures and a plummeting stock market. Even though downstream industries in the real 
economy face negative effects from the crisis, their losses would be smaller than that of 
the financial sector. For instance, in the United States, while the Great Depression wrought 
much hardship, by the 1933 Bank Holiday it had eviscerated the banking sector in par-
ticular (Hendrickson, 2001). In contrast, in a ‘finance-light’ crisis, a few ‘troublesome’ 
firms might experience losses, but the real economy experiences the bulk of economic 
pain. Post-crisis responses by governments and central banks, such as bank bailouts, can 
often generate a finance-light outcome. For instance, the Bank of England–led bailout of 
Barings in 1890 blunted the impact of the crisis on the financial sector, but failed to pre-
vent a protracted recession in Britain.
Thus, while financial crises may increase regulatory scrutiny, the impact of crises on 
the financial sector augments the likelihood of reregulation. Financial firms occupy a dif-
ferent position on the growth–stability tradeoff than other actors, and seek to influence 
policy in their preferred direction. Finance-heavy crises undermine these channels for 
influence: financial firms influence policymakers and regulators through campaign dona-
tions (Stratmann, 2002), and by indirect means of influence like the iron triangle 
(Grossman and Helpmann, 2001). In a zero-sum battle for influence through campaign 
donations, dwindling coffers are a problem. Similarly, employment in the financial sector 
for a retiring regulator is an unattractive inducement when banks and investment firms are 
failing. Moreover, financial firms themselves may accept stricter regulation in the face of 
a serious crisis. Hendrickson (2001), for instance, finds evidence that the precarious posi-
tion of financial firms after the banking crisis of 1932 weakened financial sector opposi-
tion to the Glass–Steagall act. Of course, it is necessary to stress that financial sector 
preferences for less regulation are relative. Finance might push for the status quo, or even 
increased regulation following a crisis, but they are likely to be less enthusiastic for 
reforms than other sectors of the economy.
Thus, I propose two hypotheses: financial crises generally produce increased regula-
tion; however, finance-heavy crises amplify the push for regulatory stringency, as non-
financial actors are better able to push policymakers toward their preferred positions. In 
contrast, finance-light crises may reduce regulation, relative to finance-heavy crises:
H1. Financial regulation increases after financial crises.
H2. Finance-heavy crises increase regulation, while finance-light crises reduce 
regulation.
Finance-heavy and finance-light crises are also likely to impact ideational debates. A 
finance-heavy crisis might be interpreted in a manner unflattering to finance—overreach-
ing financial intermediaries engaging in unwise or unethical activities paint unfettered 
markets in a negative light. Insofar as financial firms influence debate, their influence will 
be weakened by diminished resources. Many of the think-tanks that transmit academic 
ideas to the public are privately financed (Stone, 1996). Similarly, when employment in 
finance is highly desirable, economists may select research questions with the prospects 
of private sector employment in mind. Not only do employment motivations inure 
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scholars to ask questions of interest to finance, access to proprietary data may require a 
degree of compromise (Zingales, 2013). In contrast, a finance-heavy crisis should weaken 
these channels for financial influence. Thus, while regulatory reform may coincide with 
ideational shifts, financial crises might influence reform and ideational debates.
Domestic politics
Many works suggest that it matters ‘who rules’, although they differ on the mechanism. 
Partisanship and sectoral influence present distinct patterns on how policymakers might 
regulate financial sector actors. As with crises, domestic politics also impact ideational 
discourse.
Some works emphasize right–left differences as important drivers of economic policy. 
For instances, Hibbs (1977) abstracts policy differences from the Phillips curve, the right 
fears inflation (which hurts capital) while the left fears unemployment (which hurts labor). 
Focusing more on the politics of finance, Simmons (1994) argues that left–right differ-
ences drove the response to financial crises in the gold standard era, with the right favoring 
protectionism and the left, devaluation. While this frame offers insight into many areas of 
economic policymaking, it is less fruitful on financial regulatory questions. One issue is 
that the implications of a tradeoff between growth and stability for capital and labour are 
not obvious. Capital in emerging sectors might have dramatically different interests than 
capital in old-growth sectors. Moreover, the politics of financial regulation often eschews 
left–right patterns. In the United States, for instance, Democratic President Bill Clinton 
signed bills eliminating interstate branching restrictions, the Glass–Steagall system, and 
restrictions on derivative trading. Furthermore, ‘pro-business’ coalitions depend not only 
on business actors with broad, diversified interests, but also actors able to coordinate them. 
Firms may often be unwilling to underwrite the costs of broadly pro-business political 
advocacy, preferring to mobilize around narrower issues (Mizruchi, 2013).
Rather than broad left–right or capital–labor distinctions, policy might be driven by 
sectoral politics. No sector has a greater stake in financial regulation than the financial 
sector itself. Accordingly, the relative influence of the dominant securities and banking 
institutions and the real economy are relevant. Reporting standards impose costs, and 
reduce information asymmetry between financial actors and others. Capital or reserve 
ratio requirements prevent firms from using capital for profitable investments. Restrictions 
on branching or the scope of operations for financial institutions prevent firms from 
engaging in new activities. While the fruits of finance-led growth flow disproportionately 
to the firms underwriting economic expansion, the costs of instability are widely shared. 
Thus, financial firms are likely to favor less regulation than other actors. These prefer-
ences are relative, of course, and within a diverse financial sector, some banks and securi-
ties firms may diverge from the sector as a whole.
A powerful financial sector can influence policy through myriad channels. Even left-
leaning governments need the confidence of financial markets to retain power. As James 
Carville opined, ‘I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the 
president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond 
market. You can intimidate everybody’.6  Legislators, in turn, may be influenced by the 
promise of future employment as lobbyists. In the United States, where lax campaign 
finance laws allow us to examine campaign donations as a window into financial sector 
preferences, finance tends to prefer winners. Whatever qualms financial institutions had 
about Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Webber, 2000), Bill Clinton (Ferguson, 
Lee 871
1995), or Barack Obama (Center for Responsive Politics, 2016), they were willing to put 
those aside in exchange for access and influence. Of course policy is contested, and when 
the financial sector is weak, compared to the real economy, its priorities are less likely to 
be enacted:
H3. When financial wealth as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is greater, 
governments will be less likely to impose regulations.
The financial sector can exert direct and indirect influence on economic ideas. For 
instance, Gould (2006) argues that the financial sector effectively lobbies the purportedly 
technical International Monetary Fund (IMF), shifting the priorities of a significant font 
of expertise toward the financial sector. As with legislators, private sector employment 
and consulting opportunities remain lucrative options for many economists—particularly 
those at the top of their fields. Lobbying may have a second-order effect as well—if hir-
ing agencies are likely to emphasize financial sector priorities, economists seeking future 
employment might be more likely to devise research agendas compatible with financial 
sector objectives (Zingales, 2013). Likewise, regulators and academics often rely on pri-
vate sector actors for expertise, particularly as the financial sector grows more complex 
(Johnson and Kwak, 2011; Underhill, 2015). Financial sector influence need not result 
from a conscious conspiracy. Economists may simply ask questions that are of interest to 
the financial sector when the financial sector is relatively large.
Competitiveness
Other works emphasize the importance of competition for global economic leadership 
and its interactions with ideational and policy change.7 Seabrooke (2006) discusses how 
states used credit expansion to legitimize a broader drive for global financial power. 
Similarly, Helleiner (1996) argues that economic realpolitik drove an Anglo-American 
return to globalization in the 1970s. Dollarization shored up America’s global position, 
while Britain’s ‘treasury-city compact’ was hungry to restore Britain’s position as a lead-
ing financial center. Helleiner and Pagliari’s (2010) later work on the 2008 crisis similarly 
emphasizes competitive pressures, although also discussing how interest groups and 
changing ideas were important in post-crisis reform.
I offer a more general argument linking global competition and financial regulation. 
Many traditions within international relations discuss the idea of global leadership as a 
prize, conferring rents and influence to the dominant power (Modelski and Thompson, 
1996; Organski and Kugler, 1980). Many of the rents (control of the global reserve cur-
rency, a dominant role in global economic institutions, and ownership of the world’s 
leading stock exchange) are zero-sum, and difficult to share. There are no retirement 
homes for former hegemons—declining powers experience slow growth, lose the struc-
tural benefits of leadership, and often find the domestic institutional idiosyncrasies 
developed during primacy ill-suited for their needs (Kennedy, 1987). When the gap in 
capabilities between the lead economy and its nearest challenger is small, competitive 
dynamics may push governments to adopt risky, pro-growth deregulation to reverse 
decline.8 For instance, when France challenged Britain in the mid-19th century, Lord 
Palmerston gutted the stringent Peel Act, and adopted limited liability banking. While 
a subsequent boom in company subscriptions helped shore up the British position, 
reform also contributed to the Overend–Gurney crisis of 1866. Even states (or cities) 
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vying for regional financial leaders (for instance Shanghai–Tokyo–Singapore–Hong 
Kong competition) may face similar pressures. Anglo-American financial rivalry in the 
1920s (Costigliola, 1977) and US–Japanese competition in the 1980s would also resem-
ble this pattern.
H4. When the relative financial power of the leading economy is weak, governments 
will be less likely to impose regulations.
Competitive pressures also have a causal relationship with economic ideas. Lead econ-
omies at their peak often favor the free flow of capital, owing to their domestic makeup 
and international interests. Domestically, countries achieving technological and financial 
primacy have been characterized by nimble capital markets, adept at underwriting the 
innovative firms (Amable, 2003). Globally, lead economies export high-margin advanced 
goods that few other states can produce and have much surplus capital to invest abroad. 
In contrast, late developers have distinct institutions from those at the cutting edge, char-
acterized by large banks and state intervention to facilitate economies of scale 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). In eras where the lead economy is in relative decline, observers 
are more likely to adopt critical views of lead economy institutions and favorable views 
of late developers. Policies like credit expansion can stave off legitimacy critiques 
(Seabrooke, 2006), but their embrace belies increasing doubts in the free-market eco-
nomic order. For economists, decline may raise questions as well. Assessments of the best 
economic system depend, in part, on data. If the lead economy—a critical case for most 
analyses—experiences anemic growth, many will question its prevailing policies. 
Furthermore, lead economies directly impact the spread of economic ideas globally 
through international institutions like the IMF (Copelovitch, 2010). Should their influ-
ence wane, global institutions may embrace alternative models. In short, just as was the 
case for crises and sectoral politics, there are good reasons to believe that the declining 
relative position of leading economies may weaken market ideals, even as they increase 
the material incentives to adopt policies of deregulation.
Ideas
Superficially, it may appear as if broad ideational shifts can explain policy shifts. For 
instance, many might explain the less-regulated 19th century, more regulated Bretton-
Woods era, and moderately regulated post-Bretton-Woods era by pointing to an age of 
Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes, and Milton Friedman, respectively. Yet each of 
those ideational shifts emerged alongside significant material changes that could plausi-
bly influence regulation and the thinking of economists themselves. Academia provides 
policymakers with an abundance of choice over which ideas to implement. Rather, if one 
is interested in the role of ideas, it may make more sense to look at how ideas become 
adopted by governments in the first place.
The epistemic community literature examines how communities form around ideas, 
penetrate the corridors of power, and eventually implement their grand designs (see Adler 
and Haas, 1992). For instance, the emergence of limited liability banking in the United 
Kingdom involved distinct epistemic communities with divergent motivations. In the 
1830s, Christian Socialists and some economists (including John Stuart Mill) advocated 
limited liability as a means to democratize banking, expanding credit for the working 
class. While successful in winning a Committee investigating limited liability, the 
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movement failed to enact its plans. In contrast, a later effort emphasizing limited liability 
as an extension of laissez-faire principles was more successful. Although Lord Palmerston, 
Prime Minister during the limited liability debate of the 1850s, was pragmatic on eco-
nomic matters, he was surrounded by limited liability advocates (Taylor, 2006). Chwieroth 
(2007, 2010) offers one of the few quantitative tests of an epistemic community model, 
finding that the presence of neoliberal economists increased the likelihood of current 
account liberalization in developing countries. Lay accounts seeking to explain the finan-
cial deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s, in turn, might variously emphasize Alan 
Greenspan or Larry Summers as being critical in turning abstract principles into policy 
(Reich, 1997).
Thus, although governments are unresponsive to shifts in academic debate, circum-
stances may shift the set of ideas held by elites. Shifts in elite perceptions may themselves 
be driven by material considerations—policymakers are searching for ideas that will help 
them understand real changes in competitiveness or the likelihood of financial crises. 
Ideologically similar governments may yet enact different policies depending upon which 
epistemic communities frame the choices they make. As with other factors considered 
here, elite ideas might also have a feedback loop, influencing academic debate. The ideas 
that elites consider are more likely to be enacted as policy, thus giving academics some-
thing to study. It is good and well for some economist to propose a global bank tax, but 
such proposals are difficult to study empirically until after they are implemented. Thus, I 
propose a hypothesis about the influence of ideas on policy.
H5. When elites favor pro-market ideas, governments will be less likely to impose 
financial regulations.
To summarize, there are good reasons to believe that financial crises, financial sector 
strength, and competitive pressures influence financial regulation. However, in order to 
gauge the independent impact of ideational change, it is necessary to distinguish how 
plausible material factors influence both ideas and policy. It is also useful to distinguish 
between ideas held by elites and those held by academics. Simply ascribing explanatory 
power to broad ideational shifts runs the risk of omitted variable bias, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. Many factors predicting regulatory change are likely to change simultaneously, 
sometimes in contradictory ways that inhibit reform (for instance, a crisis might increase 
pressure to regulate, while weakening competitiveness). Different political systems, insti-
tutions can heighten or dampen contending material or ideational channels (Hall, 1989). 
That is why it is useful for our purposes to consider a broad framework.
Method
In order to assess my framework, I assembled data on British and American financial 
regulation during the period when each was either the leading financial power, or a strong 
contender.9 There are a few reasons for an Anglo-American focus. First, I measured shifts 
in economic thought over time using book data. The book data for the English language 
is more complete than for other languages, and a relatively strong transatlantic flow of 
ideas makes it possible to use the same ideational dataset for both countries. Second, as 
the leading financial powers for the period under question, neither state is likely to have 
adopted the policies it did due to coercion by others. Thus, in Britain and the United 
States, policymakers had a wider scope for choice than, say, most developing countries. 
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Third, both countries represent critical cases, both due to their size, and their role as hubs 
for institutional diffusion and ideational imitation.
The long time scope is additionally useful because it allows one to look at multiple 
periods of rapid financial regulatory reform. Major British reforms include the limited 
liability revolution of the 1850s, banking reform in 1878, the imposition of wartime con-
trols, the interwar return to normalcy, reform after the Second World War, and deregula-
tion during the Thatcher years. For the United States, the period in question runs from 
1870, as the US GDP passed that of Britain (Maddison, 2013), to the deregulation of the 
1980s and 1990s. Obviously, there are downsides to a macrohistorical approach as well. 
Idiosyncratic features of a particular reform episode might be missed. At the same time, 
it is useful to theorize about political phenomena from multiple vantage points—to see 
what can be generalized and what cannot.
Both the theoretical goals of this project, and methodological considerations informed 
my empirical approach. A number of issues common to time series analysis had to be 
addressed by the model. First, both of the data series were non-stationary, as confirmed 
by an Augmented Dickey–Fuller test. Simply regressing in the face of non-stationarity 
would be problematic, because of the presence of a unit root process—a stochastic trend 
which causes exogenous shocks to impact the model for all eternity (Enders, 2001). One 
solution to non-stationarity is differencing, which is recommended by proponents of a 
Box–Jenkins approach (McCleary and Hay, 1980). However, differencing eliminates 
interesting long-term dynamics, resulting in model misspecification (Ostrom and Smith, 
1992). Given that my objective is to find out the long-term correlates of regulation, a dif-
ferenced model would be ill-equipped to test the theory under investigation here. 
Furthermore, many variables investigated here exhibit the property of cointegration. A 
non-stationary time series that is stationary after I differences is said to be cointegrated at 
order I. Differencing a cointegrated series entails throwing away valuable information 
about the long-term relationships between variables.
Engle and Granger (1987) introduced the error correction model, as a more appropri-
ate way in which to address cointegrated data. An error correction model includes an error 
Figure 1. Hypothesized influences on ideas and regulation.
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correction term alongside a differenced series, in order to distinguish usefully between 
long-term and short-term dynamics. As Murray (1994) explains, imagine that the ‘drunk’ 
of random walk fame owned a dog. As the master called out for the dog, and the dog 
responded to its master’s voice (the error correction mechanism), the two might gradually 
approach one another, even if their meandering path resembled a random walk in the 
short-run. Indeed, even if non-stationarity were not a concern, it can be theoretically use-
ful to distinguish between long- and short-term coefficients and it remains appropriate to 
run VEC models (De Boef and Keele, 2008). However, the original two-step formulation 
of Engle and Granger is not appropriate in cases where three or more series are cointe-
grated. As such, I employ the Johansen (1991) technique, which is able to identify N 
cointegrated time series (a drunk person and n dogs) to determine the rank of cointegra-
tion. Next, I run a VEC model for Britain and for the United States, with the rank indi-
cated by the Johansen test. In addition, to guard against autocorrelation and moving 
average issues, I included lags of each variable so as to minimize the Akaike information 
criterion (Greene, 2008).
The VEC approach is additionally useful because it treats all variables as endogenous 
to one another. One of my contentions is that while ideas may impact policy, policy could 
impact ideational change (or either relationship might be spurious). There is empirical 
support for such a proposition as well, as the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test showed ideas to 
be endogenous with policy in both cases.
Data
To measure the stringency of financial regulation over time, I constructed a weighted 
index of stringency across multiple dimensions for banks and securities firms. Banking 
regulation was measured by the degree to which the country possessed unit banking 
restrictions (such as branching restrictions, scope restrictions), risk management regula-
tions (such as limits to bank leverage), and bank reporting requirements. Securities regu-
lation was measured by the degree of risk management regulations (such as subscribed 
capital minimums or margin requirements), company reporting laws, and rules governing 
company formation. The banking and securities indices were then averaged, with each 
weighted based on its relative importance within the economy. The weight of banking 
regulations was based on the value of bank deposits, while that of securities was based on 
market capitalization to account for regulatory arbitrage. That is, if regulators only regu-
late one type of intermediary, investors may simply use less-regulated alternatives. A 
similar problem, albeit one I am not able to capture with this data, is exhibited by the 
growth of shadow banking institutions over the past 40 years. British and American finan-
cial regulation over time is charted in Figure 2, while a detailed list of sources is con-
tained in online Appendix 1.
In Britain, the 1844 Peel Act imposed reporting requirements, and restrictions on com-
pany formation. Coupled with an existing system of unlimited liability, risk-taking by 
financial institutions was regulated strictly. However, the Peel Act system was short-lived. 
In the 1850s, Lord Palmerston gouged the Peel Act, and old safeguards—like unlimited 
liability—were abandoned. Amidst the crash of 1878, Parliament enacted minimum sub-
scribed capital requirements for companies and new legislation allowing banks to place 
uncalled capital into a reserve, should the bank be wound up. Progressive improvements in 
company reporting requirements proceeded in the 20th century, including the elimination 
of the incompetence alibi. More significant reporting rules were passed after the Second 
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World War. Stringent rules remained in place till the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, 
who made reserve ratios voluntary and launched the ‘Big Bang’, deregulating the London 
Stock Exchange. For a list of British regulatory events, see Table 1.
Financial regulation in the United States followed a broadly cyclical pattern. Initially, 
weak regulations grew weaker still as the less-regulated equities sector outpaced the more 
regulated banking sector in size. The Great Depression prompted a second significant 
shift in the stringency of American financial regulations—the Glass–Steagall act imposed 
restrictions on banks and the Securities and Exchange Commission started to monitor 
securities. By the 1970s, however, the dismantling of the Glass–Steagall/Bretton-Woods 
system began. First, capital controls were abolished in 1974. Second, the deregulation of 
Savings and Loans banks in the 1980s eliminated a risk-averse haven for depositors (and 
a powerful opponent of bank deregulation). Third, the Federal Reserve reinterpreted the 
Glass–Steagall act in 1986, allowing banks to underwrite some securities. Each minor act 
of reform set the stage for a massive repeal of financial regulation in the 1990s, including 
the elimination of branching restrictions, the Glass–Steagall act, and the liberalization of 
derivatives trading. For a detailed history of American financial regulation, see Table 2.
To capture the state of economic ideas among public discussion and elites, I exam-
ined the work of 28 leading economists using Blaug’s (1985a, 1985b) list of the 200 
‘greatest’ economists as a guide. I coded each on whether their primary contributions 
supported or suggested limits to free markets, or neither (see online Appendix 4). To 
measure ideas in public–academic discussion, I weighted the relative influence of each 
economist over time using Google’s Ngram viewer tool (Google, 2011). The Ngram 
viewer reports the frequency of references to search phrases over time, relative to all 
other phrases in a sample of over 5 million books (approximately 4% of all books ever 
written). Subtracting the share of anti-market references from the share of pro-market 
proportion and dividing by the total relative share of books mentioning the 28 econo-
mists produced a −1 to 1 measure of the prominence of pro-market ideas (Figure 3). I 
applied the same approach to ideational prominence for elites, using UK parliamentary 
debates (UK Parliament, 2016) and US congressional hearings (US Congress, 2016) for 
data. If hypothesis 5 is correct, we should see deregulation when pro-market ideas are 
ascendant among elites, but not the public.
References to economists in books exhibit good face validity as a measure of shift-
ing ideas: the 1840s saw a swing in favor of market economics, as mercantilist think-
ers were supplanted by free traders, and later marginalists. Scholars in the marginal 
school of economics remained prominent up till the Great Depression, despite an 
Figure 2. British (1846–2007) and American (1870–2007) regulatory stringency.
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intellectual challenge from radicals like Marx or Veblen. The Depression, however, 
saw a marked turn toward Keynesian ideas, which continued until the 1970s. Finally, 
the past four decades have seen the resurgence of pro-market economists. All three 
series seem to move in similar ways; indeed, the Hansard data have a .6838 with the 
book series while Congressional Hearing series and the book series have a correlation 
coefficient of .8242.
In order to test hypothesis 1, that crises increase regulation, I included a variable meas-
uring the incidence of a financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) discuss a number of 
different types of crises, including banking crises, currency crises, stock market crashes, 
debt crises, and hyperinflation. I include all types of crises, except debt crises, because 
excluding banking, currency, stock market, or hyperinflation crises might say more about 
a country’s relative preference for different sectors of the economy, than its regulatory 
preferences. Crises may coincide, prompting difficult choices: for instance, a country 
beset by a banking and currency crisis might defend the currency, resulting in deflation 
and a banking collapse, or use monetary policy to save the banking system, depreciating 
the currency in the process. I excluded debt crises for two reasons: debt crises are the 
mildest form of crisis and debt crises are often the result of the debt-deleveraging phase 
of other types of crises rather than distinct events (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). In particu-
lar, domestic debt crises did not disrupt the payments system the way other crises did. For 
instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) consider 1873–1883 as a domestic debt crisis for 
Table 1. British regulatory timeline, 1846–2005.
Banking Equities
1846, banks required to make annual 
reports, with minimum share capital of 
£100,000, no unit banking restrictions
1846, annual reports required but standards 
unclear, companies subject to minimum 
capital requirements, Board of Trade 
approval necessary for company formation
1855–1857, reporting restrictions eliminated, 
Peel Act repealed but unlimited liability remains
1855–1857, reporting requirements abolished 
(restored in 1857, but not mandatory), capital 
minimums eliminated, formation of limited 
liability companies liberalized
1862, limited liability extended to banks 1877, minimum subscribed capital for 
companies imposed
1878–1879, compulsory audits required, 
reserve liability imposed
1900, annual audits required by law but 
contents unclear
1947, Companies Act of 1947 adds reporting 
requirements, but allows concealment
1906, clarification of reporting requirements
1971, concealment disallowed, Reserve Ratio 
Requirements imposed
1927, accounting standards tightened further
1981, voluntary system for reserve ratio 
requirements adopted
1947, Companies Act of 1947 adds reporting 
requirements
 1985–1986, Big Bang reforms, replacement of 
internal regulation with more lax, SIB, derivatives 
exempt from reporting requirements
 2000, Financial Services and Markets Act 
requires reporting of derivatives
SIB: Securities and Investment Board.
Deregulating events are indicated with italics.
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the United States, despite average growth of 5.7% per year (Maddison, 2013). Given the 
nature of my theory, which hinges on crises being harsh, I exclude the domestic debt crisis 
of 1873–1883.
In addition to a dummy variable marking crisis years, I included a second variable, 
recording the percentage change in financial wealth as a percentage of GDP in each crisis 
year was measured. This variable gauges whether a crisis was a finance-heavy (financial 
wealth fell more than GDP) or a finance-light (financial wealth fell less than GDP) crisis, 
so that I can test hypothesis 2. If hypothesis 2 is correct, finance-heavy crises should 
prompt increased regulation, while finance-light crises prompt less regulation. Crisis 
dates were taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), data on financial wealth from the 
Table 2. American regulatory timeline, 1870–2007.
Banking Equities
1870, strong reporting requirements, banking 
restrictions in most states, national charters granted 
with some restrictions, capital minimums for 
national banks, subject to double liability banking 
rules. No lender of last resort (beyond voluntary 
clearinghouses)
1870, little regulation of equities 
markets
1901, capital minimums for national banks reduced under 
the Gold Standard Act
1934, creation of the SEC, 
imposition of margin trading rules
1927, McFadden act clarifies branching rules 1945, high-margin trading rules 
introduced
1933, Glass–Steagall imposes branching restrictions and 
separation between investment and commercial banks
1974, margin trading limits lowered 
again
1980–1982, deregulation of S&L banks 1999–2000, Gramm–Leach–Bliley and 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act
1986, Fed reinterprets Glass–Steagall allowing some 
security underwriting by banks
2002, Sarbanes–Oxley passed, 
tightening accounting standards
1994, Riegle–Neal Act eliminates restrictions on bank 
branching
 
1999–2000, Gramm–Leach–Bliley eliminates Glass–
Steagall
 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission.
Deregulating events are indicated with italics.
Figure 3. The prevalence of pro-market ideas, 1846–2007, 5-year moving average.
Lee 879
sources outlined in online Appendix 2, while data on GDP was from Officer and 
Williamson (2008).
In order to test hypothesis 3, that regulation decreases when financial interests are 
strong, I employed a measure of financial wealth (bank deposits, market capitalization, 
and foreign assets) as a percentage of GDP. Sources for financial wealth are described in 
online Appendix 2.
Another key variable of this study is the gap between the leading financial power and 
its most significant challenger. To capture financial power, I calculated gross foreign assets 
as a share of global foreign assets for all major capital exporting countries (see online 
Appendix 1 for sources by country). Then for Britain and the United States, I calculated the 
absolute value of their gap with the leader or nearest challenger. If hypothesis 4 is correct, 
regulation will decrease if the gap between leaders and challengers is small, and increase 
if the gap is large (that is, the leader faces only weak competitive pressure or the challenger 
does not see a near-term opportunity to overtake the leader). Others may question this 
choice, suggesting the use of deposits or market capitalization. However, while alternate 
measures reflect the size of a country’s financial sinews, they do not tell us about interna-
tional influence. Alternately, some might suggest reserves as another measure of financial 
power. However, most of the states with large currency reserves also have fixed exchange 
rates, which they must defend against speculative attacks. Not only are reserves a fairly 
contingent measure, they are often a response to exchange rate vulnerability.
Admittedly, there are distinctions between different types of foreign investment, such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. Unfortunately, data making 
clear distinctions between the two are not available until the 20th century (Twomey, 
2000). A second line of critique might emphasize that some states with significant over-
seas assets also possess substantial liabilities. The United States, for instance, has long 
run a current account deficit. My response is twofold: liabilities themselves can be a 
source of leverage—default can be a powerful weapon. Moreover, leading global econo-
mies may take on overseas liabilities to exploit the advantages of owning the global 
reserve currency. For instance, some works suggest that the United States can reinvest 
foreign funds more profitably than others, borrowing short and investing long (Schwartz, 
2009). Sources for the financial power data are detailed in online Appendix 3. Figure 4 
charts the financial power of leadership contenders since 1846.
Finally, I controlled for the economic ideology of the government in power. For 
Britain, I coded governments on a scale between +1 (strongly in favor of free markets) 
Figure 4. Relative financial power of leading states and major challengers, 1830–2007.
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and −1 (strongly opposed to free markets). For the United States, I averaged the DW 
NOMINATE first dimension ideal point of the executive, the median senator, and the 
median House member, using data from Carroll et al. (2011). Executive branch estimates 
were derived from presidential requests and tie-breaking vice-presidential votes for 
Presidents Rutherford Hayes and Herbert Hoover, where nominate scores were unavail-
able (Lomazoff, 2009). Summary statistics of all included variables can be found in 
online Appendix 4.
Results
Before running the VEC model, I ran some diagnostic checks (see online Appendix 4 for 
a more detailed discussion). In order to determine the appropriate lag order, I selected an 
initial number of lags that minimized the Akaike information criterion. Next, I ran a 
Johansen test for each model, in order to determine the rank of cointegration. I also used 
the Akaike information criterion to determine whether a constant, restricted constant, 
trend or restricted trend produced the model of best fit, and a Lagrange multiplier test to 
examine for the presence of continued autocorrelation. If autocorrelation persisted, I 
increased the lag order of the model. The best fit model for Britain exhibited a lag order 
of 4 and cointegration rank of 4 and a restricted trend; the best fit for the United States had 
2 lags, a rank of 4, and no constant.
In explaining the results of the VEC regression, I focus on the impulse response func-
tion and variance decomposition of key independent variables for the sake of clarity and 
brevity. Regression results are less intuitive in VEC models because of the assumption 
that all variables are endogenous to one another, and because of the possibility for con-
flicting relationships between the short term, and either of the cointegrating equations. 
Standard errors for impulse response functions were calculated using the Hall bootstrap 
technique with 2000 replications, available in the Jmulti software package (Lutkepohl 
and Kraizig, 2004).
Observing the British case (Figure 5), broad ideational shifts (Panel 5E) had no impact 
on financial regulatory stringency. Rather, material factors and elite ideas had more influ-
ence. Britain also failed to respond to financial crises in the hypothesized manner. 
Financial crises exhibited a weakly significant deregulatory tendency in the long-term 
(Panel 5D) contrary to H1, while finance-heavy crises (Panel 5C) were not significant, 
contrary to hypothesis H2. The wealth of the financial sector relative to GDP tended to 
decrease regulations, consistent with H3 (Panel 5B). There was also strong support for the 
notion that competitive pressures drove deregulation (Panel 5A) in keeping with H4. 
Similarly, when elites referenced pro-market ideas, regulations fell, consistent with H5 
(Panel 5F). Finally, the ideological slant of governments had a weakly significant positive 
relationship with regulation, with right-leaning governments tending to increase regula-
tion slightly (Panel 5G).
The forecast error variance decomposition of the two ideational variables can also 
shed some light onto which factors drove ideational change. As we can see in Figure 6, 
ideas are not autonomous—material factors influenced ideational change. Whereas ideas 
referenced in books were most strongly influenced by financial crises, changes in elite 
ideas corresponded with shifts in government ideology. Overall, elite (Panel 6A) and 
public (Panel 6B) ideas did not exhibit much influence on one another, despite a strong 
correlation. This outcome is consistent with an epistemic community explanation—ideas 
matter, but British governments read economists they agree with.
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The story of regulatory change in the US was consistent with the framework of this 
article, but different from Britain (Figure 7). Unlike Britain, ideas were not a significant 
driver of regulatory change at all (Panel 7E). Consistent with H1, crises increased regula-
tion (Panel 7D), particularly finance-heavy crises (Panel 7C), keeping with H2. The rela-
tive size of the financial sector had no statistically significant impact on regulation (Panel 
7B), nor did competitive pressure (Panel 7A), contradicting H3 and H4. Finally, con-
servative governments (Panel 7G) tended to reduce regulation.
As in Britain, the forecast error variance decomposition of economic thought in the 
United States (Figure 8) exhibits strong evidence that material factors influence idea-
tional change. Both elites and public–academic discussion in the United States were 
strongly influenced by competitive pressures. As in Britain, ideology influenced elite 
ideas, though even this effect was modest considering the strong correlation between 
Figure 5. Impulse response functions of assorted factors on British financial regulatory 
stringency over 20 periods: (a) financial leadership gap, (b) financial sector wealth/GDP, (c) crisis 
impact on finance, (d) financial crisis, (e) economic ideas (books), (f) economic ideas (Hansard), 
and (g) government ideology.
GDP: gross domestic product.
Dotted line indicates 95% confidence interval. Dashed line indicates 90% confidence interval.








































































the two. Additionally, past regulatory experiences also exhibited some pressure on 
academic and elite ideas evoking a similar story to that explored by Blyth (2002). The 
shifting prominence of pro-market ideas in books was also, interestingly, influenced 
by elite ideas.
Discussion
What to make of these findings? There is little evidence that broad ideational shifts gener-
ate regulatory reform. There is a stronger case that elite ideas drive regulatory shifts, 
although this held only in Britain. Moreover, there was scant evidence that shifting eco-
nomic ideas in the public square drove change among elites. Rather, elite and public ideas 
responded considerably to material factors.
Figure 7. Impulse response functions of assorted factors on American financial regulatory 
stringency over 20 periods: (a) financial leadership gap, (b) financial sector wealth/GDP, (c) crisis 
impact on finance, (d) financial crisis, (e) economic ideas (books), (f) economic ideas (hearings), 
and (g) government ideology.
GDP: gross domestic product.
Dotted line indicates 95% confidence interval. Dashed line indicates 90% confidence interval.












































































The pattern of regulatory reform in Britain and the United States is consistent with the 
framework developed by this article. Nonetheless, stark Anglo-American differences are 
apparent in the model. In Britain, long-term drivers of change (waning competitiveness, the 
influence of the financial sector, and shifting ideas among elites) most often drive reform, 
whereas short-term change, like crises, matter more in the United States. This difference 
makes sense in light of the distinct political institutions in each country. In Britain (prior to 
the 2011 Fixed Elections Act), majority governments could wait out crises, requesting the 
dissolution of parliament in a more politically opportune time. In contrast, in the United 
States, given fixed election terms and a near-constant Congressional election cycle, crises 
may often influence elections significantly. Unable to wait out a crisis, American policy-
makers may be more reactive than British ones. For a recent example, contrast comparably 
rapid passage of the Frank–Dodd financial reforms by Democrats fearing the loss of control 
of the House in 2010, with the comparably slow process in Britain (significant financial 
reforms were not enacted till 2013). In Britain, elite ideas and policies may shift in response 
to events. In the United States, events push voters to shift elites. Change of government (in 
the presidency and Congress) may also have more of an impact in the United States. Strong 
party discipline in Britain strengthens party leaders over individual Members of Parliament 
(MPs), who have a strong incentive to target the same swing districts (McGillivray, 2004). 
In contrast, primary threats and weak party discipline encourage American members of 
Congress (and to a lesser degree, Presidents) to appeal to core constituents.
The approach taken here can be expanded and innovated upon in many ways. 
Regulatory stringency depends not only on legislation, but also enforcement. Many of the 
ways governments regulate their financial institutions are indirect, such as the appoint-
ment of regulators. Content analysis approaches, such as those employed here, can also 
be applied more broadly. Internal discussions by policymakers or regulators, like those 
conducted by the Federal Open Market Committee, could be analyzed with similar tech-
niques. References to specific economic concepts instead of economists might be 
employed to capture more refined policy distinctions. In addition to considering cases 
beyond Britain and the United States, future works might also depart from the field’s 
perennial emphasis on financial reform amidst crises. Other phenomena, such as competi-
tive pressure, can also foster financial reform.
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Notes
1. The experience of many advanced industrial democracies follows a punctuated equilibrium pattern in 
financial regulation (Grossman, 2010). Rules governing intermediation, once instated, impact the shape 
of the economy. Like electoral reform, financial reform is self-reinforcing. Consider, for instance, the life-
cycle of the American Glass–Steagall system. Glass–Steagall emerged amidst a chrysalis of intense politi-
cal conflict. However, once enacted, inter-industry jealousies undermined deregulation for years (Suarez 
and Kolodny, 2011).
2. Capital controls may offer an exception (Moschella, 2015).
3. I emphasize the pro/anti-market divide here because it has been central to regulatory debates for the long-
est period of time. My emphasis may miss more subtle, area-specific distinctions in ideational change.
4. These factors are not the only plausible pathways for complex interaction and indeed, the empirical 
approach I use considers the possibility of interactions between all factors.
5. I consider regulation of banks and securities markets. Including both can address the prospect of regula-
tory arbitrage—stringent regulation of one intermediary may simply lead more capital to be raised through 
less-regulated channels.
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6. Quoted in Reich (1997: 64). See also Ferguson (1995) for similar discussions of the Clinton administration.
7. Competition for leadership is distinct from a race-to-the-bottom story, which would suggest that capi-
tal mobility drives regulation downward. Despite a surge in race-to-the-bottom arguments in the 1990s 
(Cerny, 1995; Strange, 1998), recent works are more circumspect about the strength of downward pressure 
on regulation (Jensen, 2006; Mosley, 2000). 
8. For evidence of the tradeoff between growth and financial risk, see Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Loayza 
and Ranciere (2006).
9. For Britain, that period runs from 1846 to 2005, while the United States was included from 1870 to 2007.
Supplementary information
Additional supplementary information may be found with the online version of this article.
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